State of Utah v. Travis Johnston and Amber Barrick : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
State of Utah v. Travis Johnston and Amber Barrick
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Aldrich Nelson Weight and Esplin; Counsel for Appellant.
Christopher D. Ballard; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Matthew
P. Jube; Counsel for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Johnston, No. 20010027 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3084
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TRAVIS JOHNSTON and 
AMBER BARRICK, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 20010027-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, FROM A CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED 
FORGERY, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, BEFORE THE 
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
APPEALS DIVISION 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Counsel for Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 F | L E D 
Telephone: (801) 373-490&h Court of Appeals 
Counsel for Appellant NOV 0 2 2001 
PauteUe Stagg 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
vs. 
TRAVIS JOHNSTON and 
AMBER BARRICK, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 20010027-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, FROM A CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED 
FORGERY, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, BEFORE THE 
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
APPEALS DIVISION 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Counsel for Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: (801) 373-4912 
Counsel for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONTROLLING 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 2 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 4 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT 
APPELLANTS' ACTIONS LEGALLY CONSTITUTED THE 
OF OFFENSE OF FORGERY 4 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 6 
ADDENDA 7 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501 
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss 
Exhibit #1 
Transcript of May 8, 2000, hearing 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutory- Provisions 
Utah Code Annotated § 70A-1-201(5) 4 
Utah Code Annotated § 70A-3-104 4 
Utah Code Annotated § 70A-3-109(l)(b) 4 
Utah Code .Annotated § 76-6-407 3. 6 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501 1-4 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 1 
Cases Cited 
Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., Ill P.2d 697 (Utah 1986) 4 
State v. Donaldson, 385 P.2d 151 (Utah 1963) 5 
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998) 1 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TRAVIS JOHNSTON and 
AMBER BARRICK, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 20010027-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in its conclusions that appellants' actions legally 
constituted the offense of forgery as defined by Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501. This 
issue presents this Court with a question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). This issue was raised in appellants' oral motion to 
dismiss (R. 139). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Travis Johnston and Amber Barrick appeal from the judgment, sentence and 
commitment of the Fourth District Court after the entry of conditional pleas to the charge 
of attempted forgery, a class A misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Travis Johnston and Amber Barrick were charged by information filed in Fourth 
District Court on or about December 27, 1999, with Forgery, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501 (R.l, 61). 
On May 8, 2000, a hearing was held before the Honorable Lynn W. Davis (R. 13, 
74, 139, 140). At the hearing appellants made an oral motion to dismiss claiming that 
appellants actions in this case did not constitute a forgery (R. 139). After taking the 
matter under advisement, Judge Davis issued a written ruling denying appellants motion 
to dismiss (R. 14-15, 77-78). On July 3, 2000, Johnston and Barrick entered pleas of 
guily to the charge of attempted forgery, class A misdemeanors, conditioned upon their 
right to appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss (R. 27-28, 96-97, 125). 
On November 20, 2000, Johnston and Barrick were sentenced to 24 months court 
probation and ordered each of them to serve 14 days in the Utah County Jail's work 
diversion program, to pay a fine in the amount of $740.00, and $33.59 in restitution (R. 
105-07, 44-46). On December 14, 2000, appellants made application to the Fourth 
District Court for a certificate of probable cause (R. 47, 108). On December 15, 2000, 
Judge Davis granted the certificate (R. 51, 58, 112, 119). 
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On December 19, 2000, Johnston and Barrick filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth 
District Court (R. 60, 121). On January 25, 2001, this Court order the appeals 
consolidated (R. 132, 138). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Appellants found a money order in Provo which was made payable in the amount 
of $33.59. The "pay to order" line of the money order had been left blank. Appellants, 
who had recently become engaged to be married, were short on money so they filled 
Barrick's name in on the pay to order line, endorsed the back of the money order with her 
name and then cashed the money order in Provo. (R. 139 at 4, Exhibit #1). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants assert that the filling in of a payee's name on a money order that does 
not name a payee and the cashing of said money order is not an act of forgery because the 
action does not change the legal significance of the document nor does it constitute the 
completion or utterance of a writing purporting to be the act of another as required by 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501. Appellants assert that their actions, at best, constitute 
theft of lost or mislaid property, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-407. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT 
APPELLANTS' ACTIONS LEGALLY CONSTITUTED THE 
OF OFFENSE OF FORGERY 
Appellants assert that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the actions of 
appellants in filling in Barrick's name on the pay to order line and in endorsing the 
money order before cashing it constitutes the offense of forgery under Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-501. In order to convict appellants of forgery, the State had to prove 
that they completed a writing—in this case a money order—so that the completion purports 
to be the act of another. 
A money order-like a check-is a negotiable instrument. See Utah Code 
Annotated § 70A-3-104. The Utah Uniform Commercial Code states that a promise or 
order to pay in a negotiable instrument can be made payable to either a named individual 
or to any bearer and that a promise or order is payable to the bearer if it "does not state a 
payee." Utah Code Annotated § 70A-3-109(l)(b). Utah Code Annotated § 70A-1-201(5) 
defines "bearer" as "the person in possession of an instrument... payable to bearer or 
indorsed in blank." 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the Uniform Commercial Code defines 
a negotiable instrument from four criteria: "Specifically, it must (1) evidence a signature 
by the maker or drawer, (2) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum 
certain in money, (3) be payable on demand or at a definite time, and (4) be payable to 
order or to bearer." Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., Ill P.2d 697 (Utah 1986). Appellants 
assert that when they found the money order, it was already a completed negotiable 
instrument. One, the money order was signed by the maker. Two, the money order 
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contained an unconditional promise to pay aum certain in money. Three, the money 
order was payable on demand. Four, the money order was payable to the bearer-
appellants-because it did not state a payee. Accordingly, Judge Davis' conclusion that 
the money order was not complete until Barrick's name was filled in as payee is 
erroneous because the money order was already a completed writing or negotiable 
instrument which was payable to them as bearer prior to their act of writing Barrick's 
name on the money order as payee. 
In State v. Donaldson, 385 P.2d 151 (Utah 1963), a case in which a defendant was 
convicted of issuing a bad check, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the instrument the 
defendant had issued was, indeed, a negotiable instrument even though the defendant had 
not named an identifiable payee. The Court stated: "It is well settled by authority that the 
omission to insert in an instrument the name of a payee is not a feature or a defect which 
affects negotiability. The effect of the omission to name a payee is to invest any bona 
fide holder with the authority to fill in the blank left for that purpose by the drawer or 
maker. Such instruments are payable to the bearer until restricted in their currency as 
negotiable instruments by the insertion of the name of some particular payee." 385 P.2d 
at 151-52. 
Pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code, the money order uttered by appellants 
was a complete negotiable instrument payable to any bearer. Appellants, in inserting 
Barrick's name in the pay to order line, did not complete the money order. Rather by 
leaving the money order blank as to payee, the maker had already completed the writing 
and made the money order payable to any bearer-including appellants-and therefore no 
action was taken by appellants which purported to be the act of the maker because the 
money order was already payable to them as bearers. 
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Admittedly, when appellants found the money order they reasonably knew that it 
had been lost. In addition, appellants made no reasonable effort to return the money 
order to the maker and evidenced an intent to deprive the maker of funds represented by 
the money order. Under these facts, appellants are probably guilty of theft of lost or 
mislaid property under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-407. Appellants assert, however, 
that they are not guilty of forgery because they did not complete a writing purporting to 
be the act of another. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Johnston and Barrick ask that this Court reverse their 
convictions of attempted forgery, class A misdemeanors, . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ day of November, 2001. 
O 
Margaret IVLindsay 
Counsel fdr Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, t h i s j ^ d a y of November, 
2001. 
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ADDENDA 
7 
337 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 76-6-506 
f die owner releases any fur-bearing animal raised for 
^oimercial purposes is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
-I The Legislature finds that the release of fur-bearing 
i rmals raised for commercial purposes subjects the animals 
. > unnecessary suffering through deprivation of food and 
^ r e ; r e r and compromises their genetic integrity, thereby per-
manently depriving the owner of substantial value. 1997 
P A R T S 
FRAUD 
T6-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
. 1 • A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud 
anvone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone, he: 
' a' alters any writing of another without his authority 
or utters any such altered writing; or 
ib) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or ut ters any writing so that the 
writing or the making, completion, execution, authentica-
tion, issuance, transference, publication or utterance pur-
ports to be the act of another, whether the person is 
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed 
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than 
was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no 
such original existed. 
• 2> As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, 
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording valuable information including forms such as: 
i a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, 
privilege, or identification; 
lb) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument 
or writing issued by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other 
instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim 
against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim 
against any person or enterprise. 
13) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 1996 
76-6-502. Posses s ion of forged wri t ing or device for 
writing. 
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly pos-
sesses any writing that is a forgery as defined in Section 
76-6-501, or who with intent to defraud knowingly possesses 
any device for making any such writing, is guilty of a felony of 
the third degree, except where the altering, making, comple-
tion, execution, issuance, transfer, publication, or utterance of 
such writing would constitute a class A misdemeanor, in which 
event the possession of the writing or device for making such 
a writing shall constitute a class A misdemeanor. 1974 
76-6-503. Fraudulent hand l ing of recordable writ ings . 
1
 1J Any person who with intent to deceive or injure anyone 
falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any will, deed, mort-
gage, security instrument, or other writing for which the law 
provides public recording is guilty of fraudulent handling of 
recordable writings. 
(2) Fraudulent handling of recordable writings is a felony of 
the third degree. 1973 
'6-6-504. Tampering wi th records. 
f
 1 > Any person who, having no privilege to do so, knowingly 
salsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any writing, other 
than the writings enumerated in Section 76-6-503, or record, 
Public or private, with intent to deceive or injure any person or 
t0
 conceal any wrongdoing is guilty of tampering with records. 
2> Tampering with records is a class B misdemeanor. 1973 
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption. 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the 
payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any 
person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money property, 
or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, 
salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee 
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a 
bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check 
or draft for which payment is refused by the drawee is 
presumed to know the check or draft would not be paid if he 
had no account with the drawee at the time of issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the 
payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any 
person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, 
or other thing of value or paving for any services, wages, 
salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is 
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check 
or draft if he fails to make good and actual payment to the 
payee in the amount of the refused check or draft within 14 
days of his receiving actual notice of the check or draft's 
nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be 
punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts 
made or drawn in this state within a period not exceeding 
six months amounts to a sum that is less than $300, the 
offense is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or 
drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six 
months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $300 but is 
less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or 
drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six 
months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third 
degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or 
drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six 
months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $5,000, the 
offense is a second degree felony. 1995 
76-6-506. Financial transaction card offenses — Defi-
nitions. 
For purposes of this part: 
(1) * Authorized credit card merchant" means a person 
as defined in Section 68-3-12 who is authorized by an 
issuer to furnish money, goods, services, or anything else 
of value upon presentation of a financial transaction card 
by a card holder and to present valid credit card sales 
drafts to the issuer for payment. 
(2) "Automated banking device" means any machine 
which, when properly activated by a financial transaction 
card or a personal identification code, may be used for any 
of the purposes for which a financial transaction card may 
be used. 
(3) "Card holder" means any person or organization 
named on the face of a financial transaction card to whom 
or for whose benefit a financial transaction card is issued 
by an issuer. 
(4) "Credit card sales draft" means any sales slip, draft, 
or other written or electronic record of a sale of money, 
goods, services, or anything else of value made or pur-
ported to be made to or at the request of a card holder with 
a financial transaction card, financial transaction card 
credit number, or personal identification code, whether 
the record of the sale or purported sale is evidenced by a 
sales draft, voucher, or other similar document in writing 
or electronically recorded and transmitted. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 5-//^oO 
Founn Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMIJH, Clerk 
T^ ^Puty 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs 
AMBER BARRICK, 
TRAVIS GLENN JOHNSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
CASE NO. 991405202, 991405203 
DATE: MAY 11, 2000 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
CLERK: SGJ 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on Monday, May 8, 2000. 
Matthew Jube, Deputy Utah County Attorney, appeared for the State of Utah. Defendants were 
present and represented by Paul DeWitt of the Public Defender's OfiBce. Arguments were 
entertained and one exhibit was received. 
The Court opined, after hearing the arguments, that the more appropriate charge 
appeared to be theft of lost or mislaid property under 76-6-407, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. The Court then took the matter under advisement. 
I. 
FACTS 
The following facts were stipulated to by counsel: 
1. The defendants, Amber Barrick and Travis Glenn Johnston, came into possession 
of a money order made payable in the amount of $33.59. (See State's exhibit #1) 
It is unclear how it came into possession of the defendants. 
2. The "Pay to the Order of line had been left blank. (State's exhibit #1) 
3. On its face, the money order bore the signature and address of the victim who had 
purchased it evidently to pay a bill. 
4. The name Amber Barrick was filled in on the "Pay to the Order of" line. It was 
endorsed by Amber Barrick on the back of the instrument, and presented for 
payment. The defendants received $33.59. 
5. The victim is not acquainted with Amber Barrick or Travis Johnston. The victim 
did not authorize or intend that any money be paid to either of them and was not 
indebted to either defendant. 
n. 
DISCUSSION 
Both Amber Barrick and Travis Johnston were charged with Forgery, a Third Degree 
Felony. Under 76-6-501, a person is guilty of forgery i£ with purpose to defraud any he: 1) alters 
any writing of another without authority or completes any writing so that writing or the 
completion purports to be the act of another. 
There is no case law in Utah which addresses the unique facts of this case. It is a close 
case and certainly a court could rule either way with justification. Certainly Utah's Appellate 
Courts could give guidance in this area. 
It could be argued that by filling in her name, Ms. Barrick completed a writing so that 
writing or the completion purports to be the act of another; the purchaser or the legitimate payee. 
On the other hand one can effectively argue that the filling in of one's name on a bearer 
instrument, by its very definition, cannot be forgery, unless there is an alteration or modification. 
If Miss Barrick and Mr. Johnston presented the money order to a financial institution, 
without modifying the face of the document, there is no forgery. But that is not the case. 
One, or both, of them filled in the blank spaces (the name and the date) and Ms. Barrick 
endorsed the money order. The purchaser did not authorize these defendants to do anything. 
Without authority they completed the writing, purporting that that completion was the act of the 
purchaser. By stipulation, the Court is aware that it was not the act of the purchaser/maker. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to place 
these cases back on the calendar for waiver hearing. Counsel for the State is instructed to prepare 
an order consistent with this decision. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
AMBER BARRICK, 
TRAVIS GLENN JOHNSTON, 
Defendants 
CASE NOS. 991405202 
991405203 
ORIGINAL 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 NORTH 100 WEST 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
ORAL ARGUMENTS 
MAY 8, 2000 
REPORTED BY: Tasha Taylor, RPR, CSR 
otoomozicA 
Certified Court Transcript 
z 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
3 FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
MATTHEW P. JU3E 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 E. Center #2100 
Provo, UT 84606 
PAUL DEWITT 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
40 South 100 West #200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Certified Court Transcript 
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Provo , U t a h ; May 8, 2 00 0 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go back on the record on 
Amber Barrick and Travis Glenn Johnston. 
MR. JUBE: Your Honor, on these cases we have a 
little bit of a unique situation. We really don't disagree 
on the facts, at least the salient facts or material facts in 
the case. We have a difference of opinion as to whether or 
not those facts constitute a forgery. What we wanted to do, 
with the Court's indulgence and permission, is proffer the 
facts for you, and then make some arguments as brief as we 
can as to why we think it is or is not forgery, and have you 
decide whether it should be bound over. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JUBE: Since it's the State's case, we'll 
proceed, if that's all right, and go forth and give our 
proffer. 
May I approach, Judge? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. JUBE: I just want to have this marked for 
identification as State's Exhibit No. 1. It's actually a 
copy that the defense has. I'll present that to the Court. 
That is a copy. There's a front and a back. The first page 
of that exhibit is the front of a money order and the second 
page is the back of that money order. 
Certified fnnr-t- T 
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A 
1 The facts in this case, in brief, are as follows: 
I 
2 I That on or about the date indicated in the Information, 
3 November 13, 199S, through or between November 15, 1999, the 
defendants in this case, Ms. Barrick and Mr. Johnston, came 
across that money order that you see there here in Provo, in 
Utah County, Utah. They knew that the money order was not 
theirs and knew that it had not been made out to them. In 
fact, the payee line as you see that has the name Amber 
Barrick written on it did not have that name written on it 
when they found it. 
THE COURT: Did it have any name? 
MR. JUBE: It had no name written on it and no 
endorsement on the back. What the defendants did, they were 
short on money, they had recently been engaged to be married 
or married. At any rate, they were short on money and chose 
together to fill that document in with the name Amber 
Barrick, and then also to endorse it on the back and then 
cash it, which they did here in Provo, Utah, County Utah. 
Those are the basic facts. I think that's all we 
really need to give you. Then if we can make a brief 
argument or do you have any questions of us before we do 
that? 
THE COURT: A money order is close to finding cash 
on the ground, as if they found a $20 bill. 
MR. JUBE: It's close. The State's position is that 
Certified Court Transcript 
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it's not the same, though. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. 
MR. JUBE: Do you want me to make a brief argument:? 
THE COURT: Well, yeah. Why don't you make brief 
argument, first of all. 
MR. JUBE: Really, just the point I wanted to make, 
Your Honor, is in the statute forgery is when you do one of a 
number of things or maybe even more than one of a number of 
things to a writing. That is, you either complete it, you 
alter it, you utter it, and you know the language in the 
statute. There's several options. 
THE COURT: To defraud anyone or acknowledge that 
forgery was facilitating a fraud or perpetrated by anyone, 
made, completed, executed, uttered a writing so that the 
writing, making, completion, execution, or utterance 
purported to be the act of another, if such writing was a 
check. 
MR. JUBE: In this case, Your Honor, our position is 
that the defendants found the check. They had fraudulent 
intent, obviously they knew -- not the check, the money --
THE COURT: It's not a check. It's a money order. 
MR. JUBE: They knew the money order was not theirs, 
did not belong to them, and was not made out to them. 
THE COURT1: That might meet the first element with 
the purpose to defraud anyone. Okay. Keep going. 
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MR. JUBE: Then they completed -- arguably completed 
that document, which is necessary in order to cash a money 
order. Albeit :: is close to what we might consider bearer 
paper, it does have to at least have a payee on there. The 
State's position is that when the defendants found that, with 
fraudulent intent, completed it in order to utter it and get 
money for it. That completion purported to be the act of 
either a U.S. Bank or another lawful holder of that document. 
However, that completion was not a lawful act of 
either of those parties, either the bank or the person to 
whom the bank lawfully gave that money order. They could not 
have cashed it had they not written in -- had they not gone 
through the deception of writing in their names when it 
didn't belong to them. Basically whoever is cashing that 
thinks that U.S. Bank made a money order out to Amber 
Barrick, and U.S. Bank did not make a money order out to 
Amber Barrick or --
THE COURT: But did U.S. Bank make the money out to 
anyone? They left the name in blank. 
MR. JUBE: But they did. The person, the victim in 
this case, actually went into the bank, paid cash, paid that 
amount to get that money order. It was hers. 
THE COURT: Who is your victim? 
MR. JUBE: The victim -- the name escapes me. It's 
a Sara Bishop. I spoke with her on the phone today. She's 
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l| not here, obviously, because we agree with these facts. 
There's a little bit of a disagreement as to how the 
defendants came about the money order. It's the victim's 
opinion that they actually took it out of her mailbox because 
she wasn't in Maceys, but I think it's their claim they found 
it in a store in Maceys or somewhere. 
At any rate, they knew it wasn't theirs when they 
found it, and they used it with fraudulent intent. So our 
argument, Your Honor, is that when they fill out a name like 
that on that check, it's purported to be the act of either 
U.S. Bank or whoever lawfully held the money order initially. 
When they take it unlawfully, with fraudulent intent, and 
write their name in, they're purporting that someone else did 
that lawfully, not themselves. 
THE COURT: Isn't it better characterized as a theft 
as opposed to a forgery? 
MR. JUBE: It can be, but the main difference being 
with theft, for example with cash, $20 bill, that's clearly 
theft because nothing among the options in the forgery 
statute need to be done to facilitate the fraud. You don't 
have to complete it. You don't have to do anything to it, 
but in this case you do. 
And in layman's terms, our position is that when you 
screw with the writing, when you have to do .something to the 
writing to get it to work for you, to carry out your fraud, 
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you're committing forgery. 
THE COURT: Knowing that it does not belong to you. 
MR. JURE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: And that someone else actually is the 
payor. 
MR. JUBE: Payee. 
THE COURT: Yeah. That someone else is the payor --
I mean, someone has purchased it, and someone else is going 
to be the payee. It may or may not be that victim, because 
she or he may be making this out, or anticipated making it 
out to pay a bill or do something such as that. 
MR. JUBE: And just as -- I do know one of the 
arguments to some of the materials that counsel for the 
defense has, in Am. Jur. and other works, indicates that a 
forgery is something where whatever is done to the document 
changes the legal significance, arguing that there are some 
things you can do to a writing that really wouldn't change 
its legal significance. 
Our argument would be that in this case, obviously 
changing a different payee, when it was meant to be the 
victim or U.S. West who she was going to send the bill to, is 
changing the legal significance of that document, and 
diverting the funds from the lawful payee to now the 
defendants. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Dewitt. 
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MR. DEWITT: Well, I think, Your Honor, seeing the 
problem here, first off, we would argue that as you have 
stated that under the UCC this is a negotiable instrument. 
It is, in fact, payable to bearer. 
Under the UCC, Section 3-109, states that -- under 
the heading, "Payable to Bearer or to Order," it states: 
"(1) A promise or order is payable to bearer if it: 
(a) states that it is payable to bearer or to the 
order of bearer or otherwise indicates that the person in 
possession of the promise or order is entitled to payment; 
(b) does not state a payee." 
Which is the case in this case before the Court 
today. And that was further expressed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Donaldson, which for the record is 
385 P.2d 151. When the Court said, "It is well" -- and 
they're quoting from Am. Jur. as well -- "It is well settled 
by authority that the omission to insert in an instrument the 
name of a payee is not a feature or a defect which affects 
negotiability. The effect of the omission to name a payee is 
to invest any bona fide holder with the authority to fill in 
the blank left for that purpose by the drawer or maker." 
THE COURT: Got to be bona fide. 
MR. DEWITT: Well, absolutely. We're not stating 
that they're bona fide. We're stating that by adding that, 
it does not change the legal significant of the writing. 
Certified Court Tr^ncpr-inf 
1 "Such instruments are payable to the bearer until 
2 | restricted in their currency as negotiable instruments by the 
3 insertion of the name of some particular payee." 
4 ' In other words, when the victim here got a money 
5 , order, she paid the money for it. She had it placed before 
6 j her. At that point she signs, as the Court can see, she 
i 
7 J signs her name and address to that document, she has the 
option at that time to limit that instrument as to who can 
and who cannot negotiate it. She choose for whatever reason 
not to. 
And my mother who is in court today taught me a long 
time ago, when you write a check, you better make sure you 
fill it out, or you risk the chance that you're going to lose 
that, and it does become a bearer instrument. At the time 
they -found it and presented it, what they did was sign their 
own name, and the one part of the statute that hasn't been 
addressed clearly is the act of another. What they did was 
put in Amber's name as her own, and by negotiating on the 
back of it, she actually did nothing to change the legal 
significance of that document. 
That was then presented to a holder in due course 
who put another representation on it. Could have taken it 
and given it to somebody else, and they could have taken that 
instrument and negotiated for cash somewhere else. It's a 
well settled fact that once you endorse a check, it becomes a 
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bearer instrument. And many times I've written checks to the 
grocery store, it comes back with three or four endorsements 
down the chain. 
The thing that we're concerned about is that under 
the State's theory, if I take a check and I were to present 
it to counsel, and I filled it out, and I said, "Matt, I'm 
going to give you this check. I'll give you $25. I've left 
the line blank. Fill it in. But the one thing I do not want 
you to do is you can not give it to Gunda under any 
circumstances. That is not for her to have." 
And he goes ahead and signs it, endorses it, and 
gives it to her. It could, under this same theory, become 
forgery because it's my subjective intent that makes it 
forgery. Her subjective intent was to give it to U.S. West 
or pay an electric bill. The victims in this case --
THE COURT: They don't want to give it to Amber 
Barrick. 
MR. DEWITT: Absolutely, they did not. And there's 
a number of cases, Your Honor, I would point out that -- and 
I really don't want to take a lot of the Court's time, but 
Professors Lefave and Scott in Substantive Criminal Law 
pointed out that forgery, as they put it, forgery like false 
pretense requires a lie, which is her saying that it's my 
check. It might be a lie about the document itself. The lie 
must relate to the genuineness of the document. 
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1' In Am. Jur. they state, "An instrument so altered 
2 | that it is not the instrument signed by the maker, and if 
3 this is fraudulently and falsely done, it is forgery. 
4 Similarly, if words are added to change the effect of the 
i 
5 instrument with like intent, the crime of forgery is 
6 1 committed. Any change in an instrument which alters it's 
legal effect makes it speak in a substantial matter in 
different legal language and wherein any obligation is 
increased, diminished, or discharged is a forgery. But any 
immaterial change which even if true will not effect the 
legal liability of the parties in an action on the instrument 
does not generally amount to forgery. ,f 
There's a number of cases that are on point, they're 
from the Tenth Circuit, none from Utah that are right on 
point, that suggest that when you write your own name on a 
document and don't change the legal effect of the document, 
something about the document must be false then, after you've 
made that change. What we're saying is, we're arguing, as 
the Court's pointed out, they found something that was not 
theirs. 
And when you find, as you pointed, you find a $20 
bill, and you pick it up, have you broken the theft laws in 
Utah? Well, you can certainly argue that misplaced property, 
theft of misplaced property, however, to convict somebody of 
forgery, our point is that you must fulfill all the elements. 
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And in this case, the State cannot fulfill all the elements, 
because the only act done did not change the legal 
significance of the document, did not change the legal 
liability of any of the parties to the document. 
The only act done was by the people themselves using 
their own name. And when they were through, when they had 
passed it on, nothing had changed in that document. The next 
person could take it. Somebody could have slipped that out 
of the pile, some clerk, gone somewhere else and cashed it. 
Signed their name on the back. And it would -- again, we 
don't have forgery, we have another theft. And it would just 
go on ad infinitum, but not forgery, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JUBE: Can I have a short rebuttal? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. JUBE: Just briefly to answer a couple of 
counsel's points. 
THE COURT: It reminds me of the time I found a $20 
bill in Albertsons down here on Fifth West. I knew somebody 
had to drop it in the store. I must have gone to 25 people 
or so, I had a $20 bill in my hand, and said, "Did you drop 
this $2 0 bill?" I never could find anybody. 
MR. JUBE: It's an important analogy, actually, 
because in the case of a 20, number one, it's more difficult 
to find whose it is. In this case, there's U.S. Bank written 
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lj on the money order. There's tracking numbers, 12 numbers, it 
2 would have been very easy to find out. 
3 ; THE COURT: Why doesn't it rise to the theft cf 
4 I misplaced property, misplaced or lost property? What it is, 
it was either stolen from the mailbox, or it was found in 
some location, but it wasn't meant for them. 
MR. JUBE: The main difference is that in the case 
such as this with a money order, or a blank check, cashier's 
check, a non-cashier's check where the payee is left blank, 
is that when someone chooses to complete it, alter it, do any 
one of those options to the check in order to get the funds 
for themselves, that's what forgery is. It's where you have 
a writing that represents value, but you can't extract the 
value out of it before you do something to it. 
Otherwise, the bank will just say, "Wait a minute. 
This isn't your signature," or, "this isn't made out to you, 
we can't cash this," or a many number of options. When they 
chose to do one of those things to the writing, they're 
purporting that the U.S. Bank really in effect did that, or 
that whoever U.S. Bank gave the money order to lawfully did 
that for them. They're purporting that it was lawfully 
transferred to them by someone when it was not. 
I disagree with the fact that this was not -- this 
did not legally change the significance. Words were added 
that did change the effect of this money order. Now, instead 
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of being able to be sent to U.S. West, which is what the 
victim wanted originally, when it sat in her mailbox, now 
money was paid $33.59 to the defendants instead. That 
changes the legal effect of the document and effects 
liability. 
Now, she's liable, the victim, Ms. Bishop, for a 
bill to U.S. West, which they say she didn't pay. She's out 
$33.59 for money that she did pay out of her pocket for the 
money order and it is now in the defendants' pocket. I think 
there is one other point I wanted to make. There is a 
difference in this case between the issues of what you can do 
and what you can do legally. 
I think counsel's mother's advice, for example, is 
very apt and appropriate that you need to fill things in or 
you run the risk of the defendant or a wrongdoer being able 
to get money from you somehow, fooling the bank or whoever 
else by filling in their name. But it doesn't mean that if 
they do that, they do it illegally and walk away without 
punishment. It just means they're able to get away with it. 
So to protect ourselves we should fill in checks and money 
orders completely. But the fact that we don't, doesn't give 
defendants the right to commit the crimes of forgery and 
others with those writings. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I have to tell you that in 
the last 13 years on the bench, I've not been presented with 
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this issue. If it's payable to bearer and it is left blank, 
I don't know that it constitutes a forgery. It may 
constitute seme type of theft of misplaced property, but I'm 
going to read the case 385 P.2d 151, or have a noble law 
clerk do the same, and make a determination as it relates to 
the law. My impression is that it's theft of misplaced 
property. I'll take it under advisement, counsel. 
MR. JUBE: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: In light of that we won't have to 
proceed with the preliminary hearing until such time as the 
Court makes some initial threshold determination legally. 
MR. DEWITT: Just to inform the Court, what our 
plans are is that if you decide that, either way, they will 
go ahead -- my clients have already stated that they'll go 
ahead and plead. 
I would like to point out for the record as well, I 
wanted to give Mr. Jube a pat on the back because quite often 
in these kind of cases we had a disagreement, and in my 
limited experience, I've noticed it tends to become, "Well, 
here's your deal, but if you make this legal argument, we're 
going to hold you -- I could make it a felony." He's offered 
a misdemeanor on this. He's offered to keep that open 
through the preliminary so that we could argue it because we 
weren't sure. 
MR. JUBE: I was sure. Counsel wasn't. 
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MR. DEWITT: He's right. He was sure, but then I 
went and did the research to become sure. 
THE COURT: He didn't raise it to a capital case if 
you don't take the --
MR. DEWITT: That's right, and I just wanted to get 
on the record that I appreciated that, and we will plead 
either way that the Court decides. And both of us have said 
we'll probably come up with -- if we win, he might appeal, 
and if he wins we're going to do a sery plea. 
THE COURT: You might as well make case law in the 
State of Utah as it relates to bearer paper. 
MR. DEWITT: It's an interesting case, so, thank 
you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Proceedings in the above-entitled matter were 
concluded.) 
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